Abstract (196 words)
This article will start by providing a brief outline of the emergency planning regime, before providing an overview of the two alternative models. It will then look at how these models operate in the context of warning and informing the public under the CCA.
Emergency Planning: Overview
To achieve local-level emergency planning across the country the CCA places legal obligations on a range of relevant organisations, divided into two groups. The first group, termed 'category 1 responders' because they form the front-line of local emergency services, includes local authorities, the police, fire brigade and ambulance services. 5 The second group, termed 'category 2 responders', may also be heavily involved in specific types of emergency and includes private organisations such as utilities companies and transport operators. 6 Though this latter group's involvement in various aspects of emergency planning is required under the CCA, its duties are less onerous than 'category 1s' who bear primary responsibility for such planning. 7 Within each locality (based on police districts) these category 1 and 2 responder groups are required to co-operate, 8 share relevant information 9 and participate in a local group called a 'Local Resilience Forum' (LRF). 10 This forum organises and performs various CCA-prescribed emergency planning activities, though it has three main related tasks, all of which are undertaken by its category 1 members. First, drawing on government guidance 11 and local expertise, 12 the LRF carries out risk assessments of potential emergencies that may affect the locality. 13 Second, the forum compiles a 'Community Risk Register' 14 based on the risk assessments. This register sets out the various potential emergencies, their likelihood and potential impact. Third, the forum produces a range of emergency plans which outline the response arrangements to be followed 5 Listed in Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Part 1, Schedule 1. 6 Listed ibid Part 3, Schedule 3. 7 CCA(CP)R (n 4) reg 4. 8 ibid reg 4(1)-(3). 9 ibid reg 4(4)(3). 10 ibid regs 4(4)(b), 4(7), 4(9). 11 Cabinet Office, Emergency Preparedness (March 2012) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-preparedness> accessed 10 th November 2013, at 4.41-4.42, Box 4.4. 12 ibid 4.36 -4.37. 13 CCA (n 5) s 2(1)(a); CCA(CP)R reg 13. 14 CCA(CP)R (n 4) reg 15. The current CCR for Northumbria Local Resilience Area can be accessed via: <http://www.northumberland.gov.uk/pdf/CRR%207.1%20-%2023%20Apr%202012.pdf> accessed 10 th November 2103.
if particular emergencies occur. 15 In the event of an emergency local responders use the plans to guide their response. Where an emergency is more serious, select senior members of the LRF will form a 'Strategic Co-ordinating Group' (often termed 'Gold Command'). 16 This group, usually chaired by a senior police representative, provides management and strategic leadership to direct the emergency response.
17
The CCA supporting regulations and extensive government guidance 18 detail how these arrangements should be put into practice, e.g., by prescribing: the methods of planning; the format of documents; the procedures for allocating planning tasks to responders and information-sharing etc.; standards of 'good practice' and model protocols. Though planning occurs at a local level, this is overseen by central government; all responders are accountable to Ministers for their emergency planning activities 19 and must take account of central government guidance in their planning. 20 Central government will also become involved where an incident escalates; in a 'significant' level-1 emergency it will provide the leadership of an appointed 'Lead Government Department' with expertise in the relevant emergency area. 21 Alternatively, 'serious' level-2 emergencies and above will involve the leadership of the COBRA Cabinet committee of senior ministers.
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[1] Command vs Decentralised Structures
The influence of two alternative organisational models, one hierarchical and the other decentralised, is apparent across various parts of the CCA. Though the two functions are related, the second aspect of the duty is the focus of this article.
This second aspect of warning the public must be covered by emergency plans 67 and, in turn, responders must follow ('regard') these plans when advising the public in an emergency.
68
This ensures that a pre-prepared communications strategy, covering before, during and after an emergency, 69 is 'fully integrated' into emergency plans.
70
Guidance divides the public into three broad groups, each with different informational needs:
first, those directly involved in the emergency; second, local people and/or relatives of those directly involved; and third, the wider public and news media. 71 Guidance also highlights the needs of vulnerable groups within the public, such as the elderly, those with mobility issues or non-English-speaking groups. 72 However, across various groups, the basic rationale for the 'public advice' duty is 'the belief that a well-informed public is better able to respond to an emergency and to minimise the impact of the emergency on the community'. 73 So better public information will enable people to make better decisions, and is therefore empowering.
CCA Arrangements: Overview
Under the CCA, category 1 responders must co-operate to appoint one of their number as having lead responsibility for maintaining and implementing plans to inform the public in the event of an emergency. 75 Public information plans may cover general matters such as the generic advice to 'go in, stay in, tune in' 76 deployable in various emergencies, or relate to more specific emergencies, e.g. instructions to evacuate a particular area such as a city centre. 77 The lead 'must' be able to collaborate with other category 1 responders, and 'must' inform them of its actions (and proposed actions) to inform the public; 78 they in turn 'must'
regularly consult with the lead on these matters.
79
Collaboration, partnership and information-sharing between category 1 responders is 'the critical element in the effective delivery of information to the public' 80 and protocols can be used to help achieve this.
81
Guidance sets out more detailed arrangements for informing the public in the event of an emergency, with particular emphasis on managing media interest in an emergency. 82 It confirms that responder information should be co-ordinated from the outset of an emergency. 83 This might entail arrangements such as a shared media brief, a central press office and the involvement of a media liaison officer. 84 As the emergency develops this may be headed up by an experienced media communications specialist. 85 Where Gold Command is involved in directing an emergency response it too must 'implement media-handling and public communications plans', 86 though this can be delegated. Gold Command will also be supported and advised by a media communications 'cell'. 87 Central government occupies a background role at planning stage; the Cabinet Office issues national guidance on informing the public for responders to follow. The Cabinet Office is in turn advised by an independent committee whose stated objectives are to improve warning mechanisms, and to ensure public information is timely and effective. 88 Where an emergency becomes national in scale, central government will become involved in managing information to the public. 89 A News Co-ordination Centre can be set up at national level. 
Maintaining authority in an emergency
The concern of CCA guidance in fostering clear, hierarchical leadership in emergency handling extends to communicating with the public. The reason for this is arguably the CCA regime's focus on the needs and response of the public, or specific groups within the public.
92
Overall, the regulations stress the importance of avoiding unnecessary panic. They state that category 1 responders 'must have regard to the importance of not alarming the public unnecessarily' when publishing emergency plans 93 and when maintaining arrangements to warn and advise the public in an emergency. 94 Related to this, guidance indicates a recurring concern with maintaining public confidence in an emergency. The National Risk Register recognises that most emergencies will have a psychological impact upon the public affected. 95 The purpose of providing information in such circumstances is for practical 88 
Authoritative information in an emergency
The maintenance of responder authority is partially reliant upon its capacity to provide information that is itself authoritative; 'The flow of authoritative information … underpins the resilience of a community to disruptive challenges'. 104 Thus CCA guidance affords much attention to ensuring that information, particularly that provided to the public, is 'authoritative' and credible. 105 A useful starting point for such examination is the core objective of public communications in an emergency:
"When an emergency occurs, the key communications objective will be to deliver accurate, clear and timely information and advice to public so they feel confident, safe and well informed."
106
To foster public confidence the information it is provided must be clear, accurate and provided quickly. Rapid dissemination will be particularly essential for early alerts or warnings of sudden emergencies which must 'reach as many people as possible as quickly as possible'. 107 But beyond this, government guidance suggests that in the first hour of an emergency the public needs information regarding the basic details of the incident, health implications, practical advice (e.g. what to do, where to go) and reassurance if necessary.
108
Next, clarity requires any technical information, e.g. scientific guidance regarding the health or environmental implications of a particular emergency, to be communicated in terms that people can understand. 109 But most importantly, it requires a unified and consistent message to the public and the importance of this is repeatedly stressed in guidance. 110 Appointing a lead responder to inform the public assists in this aim by avoiding unnecessary duplication of information and conflicting messages.
111
The ideal is responders 'speaking with one voice', 112 and this is especially important regarding emergency warning systems, e.g.
evacuations. 113 Finally, information to the public must be accurate. 114 Factually correct information is vital to ensure the public is adequately informed about the situation so they can make informed decisions, 115 and in this sense contributes to public empowerment.
116
Information must also be effectively disseminated and guidance states that: 'The key to effective communication with public is getting the message right for the right audience'.
117
One key way in which the CCA regime seeks to ensure that the 'right message' reaches the 'right audience' is by utilising the media, particularly local radio and television, as a means of dissemination. Though media organisations are not afforded Category 2 responder status, they do have a 'public service' role or 'duty' in the event of an emergency. However, official confirmation of the explosions was not provided until approximately two hours after the first bomb. 127 Official information initially confirmed (incorrectly) that there had been a 'power surge' on Tube 128 and was quickly overtaken by media coverage. As a result, news editors confirmed that the credibility of official information came into question. 129 The committee found that the gap between known information and police confirmations can result in a loss 124 Additionally, according to guidance, the media's real-time reportage, which will include individual experiences and/or analysis of the emergency response, is 'an important source of information' that will be fed back to Gold Command 157 and presumably may be used as a basis for further action.
In short, responders need the media (as a conduit to the public and as a source of intelligence) but simultaneously compete with the media (in reportage mode) where we see a struggle for narrative control and informational authority. The clear, authoritative voice of responders becomes potentially just one among many.
The impact of new technologies and media
The emergence of digital technologies, particularly mobile phones and web-based media such as social networking sites (SNS) like Facebook and Twitter raises further challenges (as well as opportunities) regarding informing the public in emergencies. Government guidance does recognise the potential uses of social media in emergency communications with the public.
Though it outlines certain risks with the medium, 158 it suggests that LRFs might consider producing social media protocols. 159 The volume of SNS-related guidance has gradually increased, 160 arguably reflecting official recognition of its social significance. 
Conclusion
Though clear, decisive leadership is an important aspect of an effective emergency response (alongside co-operation and flexibility), a command-and-control approach to information management in emergencies is increasingly outmoded and unviable, particularly in light of the potentially democratising forces of new technology. Information dissemination in emergencies does not follow a basic top-down, linear model; instead the flow of information is more complex and reciprocal, fluid and evasive. Government guidance does on occasion acknowledge this, e.g. by claiming that the monitoring of media and SNS can yield valuable intelligence for responders. Thus it becomes apparent that the authorities provide information to the media and public, the media provides information to the public and authorities and, finally the public provides information to the media and authorities. This circulating information is used by all parties as a basis for action, therefore producing more information, which is used in turn as a basis for further (or modified) action.
Yet elsewhere government guidance reveals the ongoing tendency to cling onto an informational hegemony. For example, despite accepting that the media and SNS may provide useful information, elsewhere guidance indicates an underlying assumption that such information will be false or critical and the best way to minimise this risk is to tactically feed information and manage media (old and new) so that the official narrative dominates. This is arguably justified at the height of an emergency where (e.g.) responders need people to take specific actions. But beyond this, government needs to grasp that the 'official' narrative of events is not the only, or indeed the correct, one. Sometimes the authorities get it wrong, and sometimes official information about a crisis is not the only truth.
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